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Abstract 
In this paper, we document how we carried out a research that aimed at measuring the economic 
preferences of high school students. We describe the preferences that we study and what experimental 
games we used to investigate them. Then we report how we carried out the experiments in the schools. We 
provide detailed descriptive statistics on the preferences in aggregate and also school by school. Last, we 
validate our measurement by comparing the measured preferences to those in the literature. 
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1 Introduction 
From March 2018 to March 2020, we visited 10 secondary schools in Hungary to measure 
the economic preferences of students. This paper documents how we carried out the measurements, 
what issues arose and how we solved them. We also present detailed descriptive statistics and 
perform a validation exercise. Overall, we measured time, risk, social and competitive preferences 
of 1276 students in 71 school classes (groups of students studying the major subjects together). As 
we will show, the correlations between the measured preferences and the associations between the 
preferences and socio-demographics of the students are in line with those reported in the literature.  
The project has been funded by the National Research and Development Office of Hungary 
(project no. 124396). The experiments were run in Hungarian, and also the related legal documents 
are available in Hungarian here: https://www.mtakti.hu/kapcsolat/altalanos-tajekoztato-a-
kiserletekrol/. 
The experiments were anonymous, but we can link the individual preferences with the 
individual data from the National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) – see more details 
below – which allows us to see how preferences relate to individual school performance, aspiration 
and other school characteristics (type of class, curriculum, location, etc.). It also provides us with 
useful information about the participants’ family background. With the detailed preference map of 
the students and the additional information on their family background and school performance, 
we want to study several research questions. For instance, we are interested in the distribution of 
preferences between and within schools, how family background associates with preferences, the 
association of past school performance and recent preferences, the mediating power of family 
between past school performance and preferences. Since we have school-class level data, we can 
also study if classes with better aggregated social preferences perform better academically. That 
is, do classes where students are more generous, cooperative and trusting exhibit better academic 
results? 
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In this report, we present only the descriptive statistics of the data that we have collected 
and defer the more detailed statistical and econometric analysis to future research papers. 
2 Preferences and experimental games 
In the last decade, the study of adolescents’ preferences has become a very intense field, 
mostly aiming to understand how those preferences affect school performance and behaviour or 
later life outcomes. Most of the studies in this literature focus only on a limited set of preferences 
(see Sutter et al. 2019, for a survey of the literature). If the preferences are correlated, then a 
separate measurement of them and inferences drawn from those measurements may lead to 
incorrect conclusions. For instance, the measurement of time preferences involves the choice 
between amounts of money to be received at different points in time. However, since the future is 
inherently risky, these intertemporal choices may be affected by risk preferences as well. Similarly, 
entering a competition is a risky choice. People, who are risk-averse, might be opting out from 
competitive situations, even if they would not shy away from competition, ceteris paribus.  
Our goal was to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the preferences of the participants. 
Therefore, we chose to measure the most basic and widely studied preferences: time, risk, social 
and competitive preferences. Social preferences include generosity (also known as altruism), 
cooperation and trust. Overall, students participated in 8 experimental tasks, so we have a detailed 
dataset that allows us to obtain a fairly accurate map of preferences. With this set of preferences, 
it is possible to pin down the effect of separate preferences because we can control for the effect 
of the other ones. 
2.1 Procedures 
We conducted our computer-based experiment in 71 classes in 10 schools. Before starting 
the project, we contacted all educational providers in Hungary with at least one secondary school 
(academic, vocational or mixed) to request permission to run the experiment in their institutions. 
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Providers with only Special Vocational Schools were left out (see Lénárd, Horn and Kiss 2020). 
The schools included in our sample were either suggested by the provider or – given the positive 
feedback from their provider – they voluntarily indicated their willingness to participate. Five of 
them operate in Budapest and five in smaller rural towns of Hungary. To maintain the anonymity 
of the schools, we use acronyms, see Table 1. 
 
FB KB KB2 KK KSZ MK NE PB Pilot SZB Total 
Academic or vocational          
secondary school Ac. Ac. Vs. + Ac. Ac. Vs. + Ac. Vs. + Ac. Ac. Ac. Ac. Ac.  
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 18 
2019 4 10 4 0 0 5 4 4 0 4 35 
2020 6 0 0 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 18 
Total 10 10 4 7 5 5 4 4 18 4 71 
Note.: Ac. – academic, Vs. – vocational secondary 
Table 1. School classes by school and year 
Naturally, our sample of schools is not representative of the total school population of 
Hungary, as we went mainly to academic tracks and a few vocational secondary schools (offering 
maturity exams). Figures 1 and 2 compare our sample to the whole universe of such schools in 
Hungary in terms of socioeconomic status (captured by the highest level of education of the 
mother) and gender composition. Figure 3 compares 6th-grade math test scores of the students in 
our sample to the test scores of 6th grade students in 2017. 
Figure 1 shows that the socioeconomic status of the students that participated in our 
experiments is higher than that of the whole population as the share of students in our sample who 
have a mother with a tertiary degree is higher than the same share in the population. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of highest level of education of student’s mother in our sample and the population 
Figure 2 shows that in terms of gender composition, the share of females is somewhat 
higher in our sample than in the population, but the difference is not pronounced. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of gender in our sample and the population 
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Figure 3 reveals that the mathematics test scores measured by the National Assessment of 
Basic Competences in 6th grade are on average higher in our sample than they are in the population 
of all 6th-grade students in 2017.1 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of test scores in 6th grade in our sample and the population 
The experiments were conducted during school hours, with each session being roughly as 
long as a regular lesson. Since we went to the schools and carried out the experiment there, we had 
to adapt to the time schedule of the schools. In most Hungarian schools, classes are 45 minutes 
long, followed by a 15-minute long break. Thus, we had 45 minutes (at most 60 minutes) to run 
the experiment with a class. 
Participation was voluntary and anonymous. We sent out the data protection statement to 
all parents and children prior to the assessment, notifying them that in our survey we ask for the 
students’ IDs used at the National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) which allows us to 
connect our experimental data to anonymous NABC data on school performance and 
socioeconomic background at the individual level. Only two students have opted out from our 
experiments. The NABC ID is a hash-code of the educational IDs of the students, and is used only 
 
1
 The difference is significant (t-test, p<0.0001). 
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to identify students within the NABC surveys but are otherwise not linked to any other datasets. 
Education providers had also been notified that we would collect NABC IDs, and none of them 
protested against this practice. 
We asked the schools to distribute the NABC IDs to the students before the experiment on 
paper, which they had to take away after. Students could only start the experimental games after 
typing in their IDs, but no other individual data were asked.2 
Participants were classmates in all sessions, which is an important feature in our experiment 
that allowed us to measure in-group and out-group favouritism (see section 2.4.1) as well as other 
class-level characteristics. Some of the tasks were individual tasks, where payoffs did not depend 
on the choices of other participants. Other tasks involved strategic interaction, so the decisions of 
two participants determined the payoffs. In these cases, the software that we used to program the 
experiment (z-Tree, Fischbacher (2007)) created student pairs randomly. Pairing always occurred 
at the end of the experiment, after obtaining information about each student’s decision in each 
hypothetical situation. When we had an odd number of participants in the room, then the last „pair” 
of students was a group of three participants. In games that required interaction, the payments of 
students in the group of three were affected by the decision of only one of the other students in 
that group. This was also randomly determined by the program. 
We used meal vouchers for the school cafeterias to incentivize the experiments. We 
explained to students that they would make decisions in 8 tasks, and at the end of the experiment, 
one of the tasks would be chosen randomly by the computer for payment (same for everyone in a 
session). Many of the tasks involved more choices. We made clear that in these cases, one of those 
choices would be picked randomly for payment. All sums were rounded to hundred Forints (the 
Hungarian currency) as we paid out the students in hundred Forints. There was no show-up fee, as 
 
2
 There were some problems of the distribution of the NABC IDs in some classes in our sample. These groups got 
temporary IDs, so we are not able to link their preference data to the NABC database, hence some background data is 
missing. 
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we have visited students in their school. We designed the payoffs so that the expected payoff would 
be around 1000 HUF (around 3 EUR).3 
Participants were informed about the payout details (e.g. random selection of tasks and 
decisions for payment) right before each session and were paid after everyone in their school group 
had finished all tasks. If one of the two time-preference tasks was selected for payment (in which 
students had to choose between different sums of money paid at different times), everyone was 
paid according to their individual decision. The sums requested at the time of the experiment were 
handed out after the experiment. Students who chose to have another amount two, four or six 
weeks later had to put their vouchers in an envelope, which we placed at the school secretariat 
asking the management of the school to give out these vouchers two, four or six weeks later (as 
indicated on each envelope).4 
On experiment day, we unpacked our laptops in the school in a designated classroom, 
turning it into our laboratory for the day. Participants used school computers in only two Budapest 
schools, which also meant using a mouse instead of a touchpad. In all the other cases, it was easier 
to bring our laptops with the necessary programs and settings, as schools have typically no or 
smaller labs. 
When participants entered the room where we carried out the experiment, they were free 
to choose a seat. They had a sheet with the instructions in front of them. Once everybody seated, 
an experimenter read aloud this instruction sheet. Any questions from the students were answered. 
A shorter version of the rules appeared on the start screen of the experiment. Participants were 
assured that all decisions remained confidential.  
 
3
 1000 HUF is around the cost of a full meal at a school cafeteria.  
4
 We were careful to choose dates for the experiments so that payments in 2,4 or 6 weeks can be received and that the 
vouchers could be used without any problem. That is, no later payment occurred during holidays. Note however, that 
the Covid-19 outbreak has impacted some of the later payments. We have agreed with the schools to distribute these 
later payments for the students when normal routine returns. Note also, as the outbreak and the imminent school 
closure was unexpected, this should not have affected the choices the students made. 
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We did not impose time limits in the different tasks (except the real-effort task to measure 
competitiveness, see below) so the participants could take their time. The only constraint, as 
mentioned, was that we had to end the experiment before the next class. We also explained to the 
participants that potentially there could be large differences in how much it would take for different 
participants to choose in different tasks, and we asked them to be patient. In fact, there was large 
heterogeneity in the time that participants spent with the games, but we had no incidents due to 
having to wait for the others who needed more time to decide. 
In all occasions, at least two experimenters were in the room to monitor if everything went 
smoothly. In the instructions, we warned the participants that we did not tolerate misbehaviour 
(speaking to others, looking at their screens etc.) and that such behaviour could be punished with 
expelling the misbehaving participant without any payments. Fortunately, no such punishments 
were needed, there was no major incident related to misbehaviour during the experiments. 
It has not been obvious in which order our 8 tasks should be performed. We took into 
account the following considerations when establishing the order. We wanted to have the two time 
preference tasks apart, as participants might have unwittingly tried to be consistent by making the 
same choices had the two tasks been neighbouring. Since the two dictator games involved the same 
decision but with different reference groups, we put these questions close to each other. The only 
task that could have affected the emotions of the participants more intensely was the 
competitiveness task, as participants were placed in a competitive setup that some of them may 
not have liked. Moreover, feedback on their performance after each round were provided. In order 
to avoid that the experience in this task affects the choices in other tasks, we put the 
competitiveness task at the end. Regarding the rest of the experimental tasks, we did not give 
feedback to the participants between tasks to avoid that the outcome of a task affects choice in the 
subsequent tasks. 
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To test if we can carry out the experiment properly, in March 2018, we went to the Pilot 
high school where we tested 18 different classes/groups of students, with differing sizes. Using 
this experience, we altered two of the initial experimental tasks. The first concerned the 
measurement of risk preferences that in the pilot were measured following Falk et al. (2018) 
gamble games, using the staircase method. Since gambles were not so natural for our subject pool, 
for the subsequent schools we opted for using the bomb risk elicitation task (Crosetto and Filippin 
2013) that involves a story about a risky choice and seemed more appropriate for high school 
students. The other change was in the competitiveness task, where we changed the real-effort task. 
In the pilot, we used the slider task (Gill and Prowse 2019), but it was susceptible to the computer 
that participants used and participants with more computer experience performed better (mainly 
due to playing computer games). Hence, the task was not neutral enough for our purpose. Instead 
of this task in the rest of the schools, we used a different real-effort task consisting of counting 
zeros and ones in 5x5 matrices (see Abeler et al. 2011). 
After each visit, we sent feedback to the schools.5 We explained briefly in the feedbacks, 
what preferences the different tasks measured, and we reported the main descriptive statistics, 
comparing them to the main findings of the literature. We also compared succinctly how different 
school groups performed. 
2.2 Time preferences (task 1 and 6) 
Time preferences express how an individual trades off earlier and later benefits and they 
are generally measured with choices that individuals make between an earlier and a later amount 
of money (see Andreoni et al. 2015; Cohen et al. 2016).  
Time preferences have at least two relevant aspects. Patience reveals how an individual 
values the future relative to the present, while time consistency indicates if this relative valuation 
 
5
 In case of two high schools in Budapest, they invited us to give a short presentation to the participants and the 
teachers. 
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is the same at different points in time. Patient individuals value the future more relative to the 
present than their less patient peers. Time consistent individuals trade off earlier and later benefits 
in the same way at different points in time. In contrast, present-biased (future-biased) individuals 
are less (more) patient in the near future than later on. To capture both aspects of time preferences, 
we needed two different time horizons. Our participants had to choose between receiving a smaller 
amount today or a larger amount in 2 weeks (task 1) and they faced the same situation, but the 
dates were 4 weeks vs. 6 weeks (task 6). On both horizons, participants had to make 5 
interdependent choices, following the staircase (or unfolding brackets) methodology (Cornsweet 
1962). This methodology uses the available number of questions efficiently to zoom in on the 
indifference point between the earlier and the later payoffs. In each case, the earlier amount was 
fixed (1000 Ft) while the later amount (X) was changed adaptively, depending on the previous 
choices. For example, if a participant chooses 1000 Ft today instead of X=1540 Ft in 2 weeks, then 
we know that her indifference point is higher than 1540 Ft, so in the next question X is increased. 
Similarly, the choice of the later amount implies a decrease in X in the next question. X varied 
from 1030 to 2150 Ft. Five questions allow a reasonable approximation to the indifference point, 
so we know how much we have to offer so that the participant is willing to wait 2 weeks to receive 
the payment.6 Suppose that a participant in task 1 (today vs. 2 weeks) in the last question chooses 
to receive 1730 Ft in 2 weeks instead of 1000 Ft today. Then (by the construction of the payoffs) 
we know that her indifference point is between 1730 Ft and the closest lower amount (1650 Ft). 
For practical reasons, in this case, we consider that her indifference point is 1650, so she needs a 
650 Ft compensation for waiting 2 weeks to receive the payment.7 If the same participant in task 
 
6
 In Appendix B we represent graphically the map of the five choices that participants may have faced during this task. 
7
 We chose to proxy time preferences by the lower bound because if a participant is very impatient and always chooses 
the immediate 1000 Ft, then we know that her indifference point is above 2150 Ft, but we do not know how much 
above it. Therefore, considering the lower bound allows us to be consistent, but admittedly we underestimate 
somewhat the indifference point. Choosing the midpoint between bounds or the upper bound would not change our 
findings qualitatively. 
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6 (4 weeks vs. 6 weeks) has the same indifference point, then she is time consistent, while a lower 
indifference point reveals that she is present-biased. 
 
Figure 4. Screenshot from the first time preference task (now vs. 2 weeks) 
There was also a 6th choice in both time preference tasks to check the rationality and / or 
thoughtfulness of the participant. In this choice, the later amount either was very high (3000 Ft, 
which is triple the amount of the immediate payment) or lower than the earlier amount (900 Ft). If 
a participant chooses always the earlier 1000 Ft instead of the later, but larger amounts, including 
3000 Ft 2 weeks later, then it implies an extraordinarily high discounting of the future, which we 
considered an outlier. Choosing a later 900 Ft instead of an earlier 1000 Ft indicates negative 
discounting which seems to be extreme. Hence, with these control questions, we can identify 
participants who have very extreme time preferences or do not take the experiment seriously. 
We explained to participants that if this task is chosen for payment, then one of the first 5 
decisions would be picked randomly by the computer and their choice in that decision would be 
implemented. For example, if a student chooses 1540 Ft in two weeks instead of 1000 Ft today, 
then she would receive the 1540 Ft in two weeks from the school administration as we explained 
above.  
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The time preference tasks measure the amount of money to be received two weeks later 
that makes a participant indifferent to receive 1000 Ft earlier. We will call these amounts 
Indifference amount now (based on choices between amounts now or in 2 weeks) and Indifference 
amount 4 weeks (based on choices between amounts in 4 weeks or in 6 weeks), and we will report 
the averages later in the paper. Larger indifference amounts indicate less patience. 
2.3 Risk preferences (task 4) 
Risk preferences indicate how an individual approaches a choice that has an uncertain 
outcome. Therefore, the tests to measure risk preferences involve some situation with uncertainty. 
Many of these tests include gambles (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 2002, Gneezy and Potters 1997, 
Holt and Laury 2002) that may seem strange to our student pool as evidenced by our experience 
in the Pilot high school, so we decided to use the bomb risk elicitation task by Crosetto and Filippin 
(2013). In this task, the participants are presented with the following short story. There is a store 
with 100 numbered boxes, one of which contains a bomb. The bomb can be in any of the boxes 
with the same probability. Participants have to decide how many boxes they want to collect, but 
the boxes can only be obtained in the order of their numbering. Earnings increase with the number 
of boxes collected that do not contain the bomb, but participants earn zero if the bomb is in one of 
their boxes. The number of boxes participants are willing to collect is a proxy for risk preferences.8 
 
8
 Crosetto and Filippin (2016) compare four risk elicitation methods that are widely used in experimental economics, 
among them the bomb risk elicitation method and find that it is a valid measure of risk preferences. 
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Figure 5. Screenshot of the risk preference task 
Participants knew that if this task was selected for payment, the computer would choose a 
random number between 0 and 100 indicating the box that contains the bomb. If the number of 
boxes that the participant decided to collect was below that number, then she would earn 20 Ft for 
each box. Otherwise, her earning would be zero. We will report the average of boxes that 
participants decided to collect (Risk-taking: # of boxes), larger numbers indicating more risk 
tolerance. 
Choosing 100 boxes is equivalent to a sure explosion and zero earnings. We set the risk-
taking measure to missing if the student took 100 boxes. 
2.4 Social preferences 
Social preferences have many aspects. In our experiment, we focused on three: generosity, 
cooperativeness and trust. 
2.4.1 Generosity (task 2 and 3) 
We measured generosity (or altruism) with the dictator game. There were two dictator 
games. In the first one (task 2) we endowed all participants with 2000 Ft that they could split 
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between themselves and somebody else in the room, that is one of the classmates. We explained 
to participants that if at the end of the experiment this task was payoff-relevant, then we would 
pair the participants randomly. In each pair, the computer would randomly select one of the 
participants whose decision would be implemented. In task 3, we repeated this game, but this time 
the co-player was not somebody from the room, but a random schoolmate. This task was 
hypothetical. 
 
Figure 6. Screenshot of the dictator game 
We will report the sum given to the classmate (Giving to classmate) and to the schoolmate 
(Giving to schoolmate), larger sums denoting more generosity. 
2.4.2 Cooperativeness (task 5) 
The second aspect of social preferences that we measured was how cooperative our 
participants were. We used the workhorse test of cooperation, the public goods game (task 5). 
However, instead of forming groups of 4 as is usual in most experiments with the public goods 
game, we applied a two-person variant. That is, we paired each participant randomly with 
somebody else from the room. Both of them were endowed with 1000 Ft, and they had to decide 
how much of the endowment to contribute to a common account, without knowing the contribution 
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of the other participant. The amount that they did not contribute to the common project was theirs. 
From the common project, each of the two participants received 75% of the total contributions, 
independently of the individual contribution. Our measure of cooperativeness is the contribution 
to the common project: the more a participant contributes, the more cooperative she is. 
To make the decision easier, on the decision screen, below the description of the task, 
participants had two sliders, both of them going from 0 to 1000, the first corresponding to their 
contribution and the second corresponding to their co-player’s contribution. By using the sliders, 
they could see the payoff consequences of different contribution combinations (see the decision 
screen in Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Screenshot from the cooperativeness task (public good game) 
We will report the contribution to the common project (Cooperation: contribution), larger 
values implying higher levels of cooperativeness. 
2.4.3 Trust (task 7) 
We used the trust game (also known as investment game by Berg et al. 1995) to measure 
trust and trustworthiness of the participants. The game had two steps. In step 1, each participant 
played the role of the sender. They started with an endowment of 1000 Ft, and they decided how 
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much to send to a randomly selected co-player in the room. The sum that they chose to send is a 
measure of trust. We told explicitly that the sum would be rounded to the nearest 100. In step 2, 
the sent amount tripled. Here everybody assumed the role of the receiver and they had to state how 
much they would send back of the 3*X if the sender had sent them X (X={0,100,200,...1000}) Ft. 
Thus, we have answers to all contingencies, and this profile of responses provides a proxy of 
trustworthiness. 
 
Figure 8. Screenshot from the second part of the trust game 
We explained to the participants that if this task were chosen for payment, then the 
computer would form random pairs in the room and one player in each pair would be randomly 
chosen as sender and the other as a receiver and their corresponding choices would determine the 
payment. 
We will report the sum that the participants sent (Trust: sum sent) and also the average 
percentage of the received sum that the participant returned (Trust: % returned). Higher values 
indicate more trusting/trustworthy participants. 
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2.5 Competitiveness (task 8) 
In the last task of the experiment, we used the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) setup to 
measure competitiveness.9 The only change that we made was to use a different real-effort task. 
Instead of adding up numbers, participants had to count zeros and ones in 5x5 matrices (for 
instance, in Abeler et al. 2011). Figure 4 shows a screenshot of the counting exercise. In each stage 
of the game, they had 1 minute to carry out the task.  
The game started with the piece-rate stage in which participants were paid based on the 
number of correctly solved matrices, each paying 100 Ft. In stage 2, participants were evaluated 
as if they participated in a tournament, only the best 25% of the participants in the room earning 
money for the task.10 However, their earnings were 4 times as high per matrix solved as in stage 
1. In stage 3, participants could choose if they wanted to get paid according to piece-rate or 
tournament, their choice indicating if they were competitive or not. After stage 3, we asked 
participants how they ranked themselves (being in the 1st / 2nd / 3rd / 4th quartile) based on their 
performance in stage 1 (piece rate) and stage 2 (tournament). These beliefs were elicited in an 
incentivized way as those who guessed correctly received 300 Ft (if this task was chosen for 
payment). 
At the end of the experiment, if the computer chose this task for payment, the computer 
picked one of the stages randomly and participants were paid according to their performance in 
that stage. 
In our descriptive tables, we will report the share of competitive participants (Competitive). 
 
9
 Lise Vesterlund was very kind to share with us their z-tree code for which we are grateful. 
10
 In case of tie, the computer randomly decided who got into the 25% to be paid. 
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Figure 9: The real-effort task in the competitiveness task: counting zeros and ones 
3 Descriptive statistics 
The full sample consists of 1276 students from 8th to 12th grades (8th grade: 41 students; 9th 
grade: 418 students; 10th grade: 385 students; 11th grade: 336 students; 12th grade: 96 students). 56 
% of all participants were female. 
We gained all student-level information – asides the economic preferences – from the 
National Assessment of Basic Competencies individual database. Gender and age data are missing 
only for a very few cases, but for 11% of the cases, socioeconomic status values are missing as 
these were self-reported in the NABC questionnaire. 
As risk and competition preferences were measured differently in the Pilot school, 
descriptive statistics are shown without the pilot data.11 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of 
all raw preference measures that we have collected. We did not use the time preference measures 
of those students who gave an extreme or thoughtless answer to our control question (see section 
 
11
 We report the descriptive statistics of the preferences measured in the Pilot school in section 3.1. 
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2.2). We also did not use the risk-taking measures of those who chose to take 100 boxes out of the 
100. 
Students earned around 1000 HUF on average with a standard deviation of around 800 
HUF (note that depending on the type of the game that was chosen for payment and the decisions 
of the students, the final profit varied between 0 and 6400 HUF).  
Variable  N Mean SD Min Max 
Female  1036      0.56      0.50      0.00      1.00 
Age  1035     16.93      1.14     14.00     21.00 
School grade  1108     10.11      0.95      9.00     12.00 
Final profit  1108   1038.99    831.70      0.00   6400.00 
Indifference amount now  1077   1410.58    406.86   1030.00   3000.00 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  1089   1414.15    344.87   1030.00   3000.00 
Risk: # of boxes  1100     33.62     18.52      1.00     99.00 
Risk, female  578     30.94     18.25      1.00     99.00 
Risk, male  450     37.38     18.64      1.00     99.00 
Giving to classmate  1108    783.66    370.18      0.00   2000.00 
Giving to schoolmate  1108    554.69    412.22      0.00   2000.00 
Cooperation: contribution  1108    605.13    275.12      0.00   1000.00 
Trust: sum sent  1108    551.81    253.69      0.00   1000.00 
Trust: % returned  1108     38.82     16.45      0.00    100.00 
Competitive  1108      0.61      0.49      0.00      1.00 
Competitive, female  583      0.56      0.50      0.00      1.00 
Competitive, male  453      0.66      0.47      0.00      1.00 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics without the pilot data 
Table 2 also reveals that students required approximately 400 extra Ft for having to wait 
two weeks to receive their payments, both when the choice was now vs 2 weeks and 4 vs 6 weeks. 
In the task measuring risk preferences, students collected on average 34 boxes which is somewhat 
lower than the literature reports (see Crosetto and Filippin 2013). Male participants collected more 
boxes than females which is an indication of higher risk tolerance, an often found gender difference 
in preferences (e.g. Croson and Gneezy 2009, or Bertrand 2011). Students were more generous 
toward their classmates than toward their schoolmates (who received about 28% of the 
endowment), giving more than 200 Ft (10% of their endowment) more to them. Participants 
contributed on average 60% of their endowment to the common project in the task measuring 
cooperation, which corresponds to the higher end of the findings in the literature (see Chaudhuri 
2011). Similarly, the 55% that participants sent in the trust game is somewhat higher than the 50% 
observed in the literature (see Johnson and Mislin 2011). Being more cooperative and trusting is 
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not surprising as in our experiment participant played with their classmates and not with strangers. 
In line with the literature, we also find that males are more competitive than females (e.g. Niederle 
and Vesterlund 2011). Overall, the main descriptive statistics are in line with those found in the 
literature. 
Table 3 shows the average preference measures by school. In some tasks, most of the 
schools exhibit similar average behaviour (e.g. sum returned in the trust game), but there are also 
big differences in other dimensions. For instance, in school MK students on average are much 
more impatient than their peers in school PB as they require more than 20% more money for 
having to wait two weeks (see row Indifference amount now).12  
School code Pilot FB KB KB2 KK KSZ MK NE PB SZB Means 
without Pilot 
Subject 167 253 149 65 166 105 98 103 99 70   
Female 0.53 0.39 0.65 0.90 0.66 0.66 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.41      0.56 
Age 16.42 16.38 17.83 15.98 16.48 19.30 16.74 17.44 16.45 17.32     16.93 
Indifference amount now 1352.50 1340.29 1451.22 1506.45 1380.43 1366.83 1569.57 1485.05 1297.08 1459.41   1410.58 
Indifference amount 4 weeks 1315.94 1307.76 1400.75 1538.44 1479.26 1443.24 1505.81 1447.50 1353.67 1428.84   1414.15 
Risk-taking 47.38 41.07 33.68 26.40 29.70 31.74 30.14 35.69 32.20 29.38     33.62 
Risk, female 51.20 39.07 32.05 26.91 27.06 29.73 28.35 34.57 28.49 27.07     30.94 
Risk, male 43.16 42.35 36.39 27.50 34.91 38.00 32.34 36.76 37.21 31.10     37.38 
Giving to classmate 892.76 705.51 862.68 851.54 808.76 869.10 852.76 654.61 735.36 808.64    783.66 
Giving to schoolmate 649.72 493.11 629.60 610.77 575.87 630.24 630.78 458.20 489.05 530.43    554.69 
Cooperation: contribution 630.95 660.98 626.85 510.29 573.86 628.30 603.63 587.73 595.18 526.29    605.13 
Trust: sum sent 634.73 618.18 573.15 478.46 504.82 544.76 528.57 549.51 546.46 500.00    551.81 
Trust: % returned 42.00 36.61 42.01 35.52 37.84 40.12 42.34 37.25 37.60 42.50     38.82 
Competitive 0.67 0.55 0.64 0.52 0.61 0.69 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.76      0.61 
Competitive, female 0.65 0.50 0.59 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.57 0.60 0.52 0.79      0.56 
Competitive, male 0.70 0.56 0.75 0.33 0.79 0.88 0.66 0.58 0.69 0.73      0.66 
Note: Risk-taking means gamble games with staircase method in the Pilot school, bomb risk elicitation task in all other schools 
Table 3. Raw averages by school 
The aggregate school-level data suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity between 
schools in the preferences that we measured. 13 Table 4 shows the z-standardized scores of all 
preferences measures (with 0 mean and 1 standard deviation). As we will show later, there is also 
considerable heterogeneity in preferences within schools. 
  
 
12
 Note also that on the other hand students on average are more generous in school MK than in school PB. 
13
 The high values in the risk-taking task in the Pilot school may be due to the fact that there we used a different task. 
We converted the measure used there so that the numbers are comparable and we represent them for sake of 
completeness. 
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School code Pilot FB KB KB2 KK KSZ MK NE PB SZB 
Indifference amount now  -0.13 -0.16 0.12 0.26 -0.06 -0.09 0.42 0.21 -0.27 0.14 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  -0.25 -0.28 0.00 0.41 0.23 0.12 0.31 0.14 -0.14 0.08 
Risk-taking 0.63 0.30 -0.09 -0.47 -0.30 -0.19 -0.28 0.01 -0.17 -0.32 
Risk, female  0.92 0.29 -0.08 -0.34 -0.33 -0.20 -0.27 0.05 -0.26 -0.33 
Risk, male  0.27 0.22 -0.10 -0.57 -0.18 -0.01 -0.31 -0.08 -0.05 -0.38 
Giving to classmate  0.26 -0.25 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.19 0.15 -0.39 -0.17 0.03 
Giving to schoolmate  0.20 -0.18 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.15 -0.26 -0.19 -0.09 
Cooperation: contribution  0.08 0.19 0.07 -0.35 -0.12 0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.30 
Trust: sum sent  0.28 0.22 0.04 -0.33 -0.23 -0.07 -0.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.25 
Trust: % returned  0.17 -0.16 0.17 -0.23 -0.09 0.05 0.19 -0.12 -0.10 0.20 
Note: Risk-taking means gamble games with staircase method in the Pilot school, bomb risk elicitation task in all other schools 
Table 4. Z-standardized averages by school 
Table 4 reports averages, but the whole distribution of preferences may provide interesting 
insights into the heterogeneity of preferences between schools as well. In Figures 10-17 we show 
boxplot graphs that illustrate how dispersed the observations are school by school.14 
 
Figure 10. Heterogeneity of the preference measures – Indifference amount now 
Figure 10 indicates that extra money needed to make a student indifferent between 
receiving the money now or in two weeks is much more dispersed in some schools than on others. 
For instance, in schools FB, KSZ and PB the indifference amounts are not only lower on average, 
but they are also more concentrated than in schools KB2, MK or NE. Figure 11 shows similar 
patterns for the other time preference task. 
 
14
 The horizontal line within the box represents the median, while the bottom / top of the box indicates the 25th / 
75th percentile of the observations. The upper (lower) adjacent value is the 75th (25th) percentile plus (minus) 3/2 
times the interquartile range. 
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Figure 11. Heterogeneity of the preference measures – Indifference amount 4 weeks 
 
Note: Risk-taking means gamble games with staircase method in the Pilot school, bomb risk elicitation task in all other schools 
Figure 12. Heterogeneity of the preference measures – Risk-taking 
Figure 12 reveals that even though the average number of boxes collected in the bomb risk 
elicitation task (our risk measure) differ considerably across schools, the distributions do not seem 
very different. 
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Figure 13. Heterogeneity of the preference measures – Giving to classmate 
 
Figure 14. Heterogeneity of the preference measures – Giving to schoolmate 
Figure 13 indicates that regarding Giving to classmate not only the average amounts differ 
across schools, but also the dispersion of the data. In schools KSZ, MK and Pilot students are not 
only more generous on average to their classmates, but in these schools, most of the students are 
similarly generous to each other. Figure 14 demonstrates that when it comes to giving to a random 
schoolmate, generosity declines, and it also becomes more dispersed. 
25 
 
 
Figure 15. Heterogeneity of the preference measures – Cooperativeness 
Figure 15 uncovers heterogeneity across schools in cooperativeness. In schools where the 
average contribution is low, the distribution tends to be less spread out than in schools with higher 
averages. 
 
Figure 16. Heterogeneity of the preference measures – Trust: sum sent 
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Heterogeneity is also present in trusting behaviour as exemplified by Figure 16. Averages 
do not differ much across schools, but clearly, the decisions are more dispersed in some schools 
than others. 
 
Figure 17. Heterogeneity of the preference measures – Trust: sum returned 
Figure 17 shows that concerning the share of money returned to the sender, we do not see 
much heterogeneity across schools. 
Although the previous figures suggest that there is some heterogeneity across schools, but 
it also shows that there is considerable overlap in behaviour across schools. In Appendix C we 
show probability density functions (both pooling all schools in one graph and separately) that 
expose the degree of similarity of behaviour across schools as it is hard to distinguish the 
probability density functions in many cases. These functions also illustrate the presence of focal 
points in many measures (e.g. giving or contribution 500 or 1000 Ft-s). 
3.1 Pilot school 
First, we ran the pilot version of the experiment. 168 students from 18 school groups 
participated in the study. All groups were academic classes, and 53% of the students were female. 
This school operates in Budapest. A unique feature of this school is that the school groups are 
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rather small, comprising less than 20 students on average. Due to technical difficulties, zTree did 
not save the data properly at the end of session 2 (Group 2), and we were only able to recover the 
output partially. The final data loss did not affect the main variables presented in Table 5. 
As reported in Table 5, most of the groups were more patient than the average of the full 
sample as they required less than 400 HUF for having to wait two weeks now or a month later. 
Regarding risk-taking, students were well above average, and in most groups, male students were 
more risk-averse than female students which is the opposite of what we observe in other schools. 
This might be due to the fact that in the Pilot school, we used a different (gambling) game for 
measuring risk aversion than in the other institutions. There is considerable heterogeneity in the 
degree of generosity, that is, in the amount of money that students would give to their classmates 
in different groups. However, this amount always exceeds the average sum they would give to a 
schoolmate. Competitiveness was also differently assessed in this school than in the others. Female 
students were more competitive in half of the groups. 
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Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Academic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Grade 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 11 8 8 8 8 8 11 11 
Subject 12 11 10 6 11 10 11 16 10 10 6 7 7 8 9 10 8 6 
Game For Payment Dictator Trust game 
Public good 
game Risk 
Time now 
vs. 2 
weeks 
Competitio
n Risk 
Time 
now vs. 
2 weeks 
Time 4 
weeks vs. 
6 weeks Dictator 
Public 
good 
game 
Time 4 
weeks vs. 
6 weeks 
Time 4 
weeks vs. 
6 weeks 
Time 4 
weeks vs. 
6 weeks Dictator Dictator Risk Dictator 
Female 0.40 0.38 0.50 0.17 0.64 0.70 0.60 0.53 0.60 0.70 0.17 0.43 0.71 0.25 0.33 0.70 0.75 0.80 
Age  15.50 15.63 15.70 16.00 15.55 15.90 15.80 18.93 18.80 18.90 19.17 14.43 15.00 14.63 14.89 14.50 17.88 17.60 
Indiff. amount now  1386.00 1410.91 1288.89 1468.33 1433.64 1358.00 1343.64 1614.29 1256.00 1361.25 1271.67 1135.71 1310.00 1313.75 1197.78 1190.00 1237.14 1545.00 
Indiff. amount 4 weeks  1336.67 1222.73 1371.00 1350.00 1331.82 1292.00 1433.64 1400.00 1325.00 1147.00 1390.00 1214.29 1196.67 1288.75 1274.44 1372.22 1258.75 1385.00 
Risk-taking  47.46 43.86 47.60 40.58 48.18 37.65 46.68 55.13 46.61 55.90 42.17 41.93 46.00 51.19 37.06 53.72 53.75 47.75 
Risk, female  43.25 55.50 49.30 53.50 56.14 42.86 43.92 64.50 44.92 57.50 56.50 49.00 47.20 38.25 40.00 57.83 54.50 51.63 
Risk, male  52.25 44.50 45.90 38.00 34.25 25.50 48.38 39.93 50.00 52.17 39.30 36.63 40.00 55.50 35.58 45.50 51.50 33.50 
Giving to classmate  1041.67 981.73 930.00 533.33 840.91 930.00 850.00 889.19 880.00 751.00 915.83 935.71 1200.00 508.75 955.56 970.00 848.75 1041.67 
Giving to schoolmate  879.17 700.00 630.00 416.67 568.18 810.00 554.55 678.06 530.00 621.00 415.83 735.71 928.57 446.25 688.89 660.00 485.00 791.67 
Cooperation: contrib. 750.00 668.18 715.00 466.67 524.55 530.00 590.91 547.25 596.00 670.00 655.50 621.43 764.29 450.00 822.22 680.00 668.75 600.00 
Trust: sum sent  675.00 700.00 630.00 500.00 600.00 690.00 536.36 543.75 670.00 670.00 650.00 771.43 800.00 487.50 588.89 650.00 712.50 616.67 
Trust: % returned  43.04 39.85 39.61 32.21 40.33 39.94 35.55 44.69 37.24 41.07 55.29 44.19 51.99 42.12 44.69 39.09 47.07 44.78 
Competitive  0.92 0.64 0.70 0.83 0.55 0.50 0.82 0.75 0.70 0.70 0.50 0.29 0.43 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.83 
Competitive, female  1.00 0.67 0.60 1.00 0.43 0.57 0.67 0.88 0.50 0.57 1.00 0.33 0.20 1.00 0.67 0.71 0.83 0.75 
Competitive, male  1.00 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.33 1.00 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.50 1.00 
Table 5. Desriptive data from the Pilot school 
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3.2 School FB 
We ran our experiment at school FB twice, first in March 2019 and then exactly a year 
later in March 2020 (two weeks before the Covid-19 lockdown). The finalized version of the 
games was used both times. This was the only school where certain school groups repeated the 
experiment (see Group 1 and Group 4 in Table 6), which also means that there are 52 students 
out of the 253 in total in this school, who appear twice in our subsample from FB. 
All groups were academic classes, and 39% of the participants were female. This school 
operates in Budapest, and we used the computers provided by the institution.  
There were no technical difficulties during the sessions. In the second year, every 
student participated in a psychological experiment attached to ours. That is, they had to play a 
short (5-10 minute) computer game measuring cognitive functions immediately before or after 
our experiment.  
In school FB, students were, on average, more patient than the average of the sample. 
Most groups were overall present biased. Both male and female students were more risk-
tolerant but less competitive than the average of the whole sample. Still, there is considerable 
heterogeneity between groups in this regard. Students in this school were less generous than the 
average, but for example Group 1 or 6 sent almost twice as much to their peers in both dictator 
games than Group 7. However, they were more cooperative and trusted their classmates more. 
Differences between different groups are also noteworthy in most of the tasks. 
The most interesting finding here is the change in preferences in the groups that 
participated in the experiment twice. For example, in the first year, female students were more 
risk-averse in Group 1 and 4. A year later, these groups were more risk-tolerant on average 
(even when we look at the averages by gender), but female students became more risk-tolerant 
in both groups compared to their male classmates. In the competition game, gender differences 
in the willingness to compete remained the same a year later. 
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Group 1 2 3 4 5 4 again 6 1 again 7 8 
Academic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Grade 9 10 10 9 9 10 9 10 10 10 
Subject 22 23 24 30 27 30 20 22 29 26 
Game For Payment 
Time 4 
weeks vs. 
6 weeks 
Public 
good 
game Competition 
Time now 
vs. 2 
weeks Risk 
Trust 
game 
Public 
good game 
Time now 
vs. 2 
weeks Dictator Competition 
Female 0.43 0.52 0.46 0.25 0.08 0.20 0.60 0.50 0.38 0.60 
Age  15.67 16.87 16.75 15.64 15.88 16.73 15.70 16.68 16.76 16.92 
Indiff. amount now  1380.45 1415.45 1463.04 1219.66 1153.85 1158.97 1346.11 1502.73 1587.14 1250.00 
Indiff. amount 4 weeks  1419.55 1324.35 1260.83 1195.33 1250.38 1209.67 1325.79 1490.00 1439.29 1233.08 
Risk: # of boxes  34.45 34.14 36.25 38.48 41.48 46.93 44.30 43.00 47.72 41.23 
Risk, female  32.00 30.09 31.82 30.00 44.50 51.50 50.42 48.82 38.27 37.53 
Risk, male  35.17 38.18 40.00 41.05 41.74 45.79 35.13 36.60 53.50 45.90 
Giving to classmate  918.18 710.57 791.67 673.63 667.33 541.67 914.00 738.14 489.83 759.62 
Giving to schoolmate  743.64 504.35 523.33 522.00 383.48 228.33 715.00 500.86 327.76 636.54 
Cooperation: contrib.  643.18 554.35 494.29 736.67 781.89 734.07 596.55 608.91 696.93 680.58 
Trust: sum sent  490.91 552.17 533.33 693.33 681.48 730.00 595.00 577.27 600.00 653.85 
Trust: % returned  41.76 31.00 43.58 37.10 33.81 30.79 45.37 39.68 35.98 31.21 
Competitive  0.64 0.48 0.67 0.60 0.33 0.43 0.65 0.50 0.59 0.62 
Competitive, female  0.67 0.42 0.64 0.43 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.55 0.27 0.53 
Competitive, male  0.58 0.55 0.69 0.62 0.35 0.46 0.63 0.45 0.78 0.70 
Table 6. Descriptive data from school FB 
3.3 School KB 
This school also operates in Budapest. We measured the preferences of 149 students in 
10 school groups, 65% of the participants were female.  
KB is a bilingual school with students whose native language is not necessarily 
Hungarian. As our experiment was entirely in Hungarian, we paid 1000 HUF to two students 
who went to one of the participating classes but were excluded from the games due to the 
language barrier. 
Using the computers of the school, we ran two sessions at the same time in two different 
classrooms.  
On the school level, students in KB were less risk-tolerant but more competitive than 
the average, even by gender. Their earlier indifference point was a bit bigger than the sample’s 
average, so they were present biased to some extent (on the group level this applies to 6 classes). 
Almost all groups were more generous than the average, and they were slightly more 
cooperative and trusted their classmates more. Heterogeneity across groups is large in many 
cases, for instance, in some groups classmates on average gave more than 200 Ft-s more to each 
other than in others.  
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Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Academic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Grade 9 11 9 11 11 11 10 9 10 9 
Subject 18 19 14 14 15 13 15 18 10 13 
Game For Payment Dictator Dictator 
Public 
good game Competition Competition 
Trust 
game 
Time 4 
weeks vs. 
6 weeks 
Time 4 
weeks vs. 
6 weeks 
Trust 
game Competition 
Female 0.61 0.63 0.46 0.57 0.60 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.83 
Age  16.67 18.95 16.92 18.57 18.73 19.00 17.86 16.76 18.00 16.92 
Indiff. amount now  1583.53 1518.95 1499.29 1300.71 1443.33 1306.15 1390.67 1557.06 1341.00 1460.00 
Indiff. amount 4 weeks  1497.06 1314.21 1515.00 1302.14 1488.67 1199.23 1434.00 1480.00 1250.00 1458.46 
Risk: # of boxes  29.78 36.53 27.86 36.64 34.93 34.92 27.67 37.83 44.20 28.38 
Risk, female  28.82 34.50 23.67 27.75 32.89 36.67 31.00 34.75 42.86 26.50 
Risk, male  31.29 40.00 29.71 48.50 38.00 31.00 25.00 42.60 47.33 25.50 
Giving to classmate  905.56 817.89 857.14 1050.00 880.07 780.77 853.33 861.06 740.00 842.31 
Giving to schoolmate  711.67 686.32 721.43 839.29 613.33 415.38 617.33 452.78 600.00 623.08 
Cooperation: contrib.  610.50 639.47 689.29 735.93 618.40 457.31 645.87 701.11 590.00 529.23 
Trust: sum sent  494.44 563.16 650.00 642.86 713.33 515.38 553.33 588.89 550.00 453.85 
Trust: % returned  42.74 39.12 45.05 48.17 46.44 38.77 44.06 40.13 41.31 34.24 
Competitive  0.72 0.68 0.71 0.43 0.80 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.62 
Competitive, female  0.73 0.58 0.67 0.25 0.78 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.57 0.60 
Competitive, male  0.71 0.86 0.71 0.67 0.83 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.67 0.50 
Table 7. Descriptive data from school KB 
3.4 School MK 
School MK was the first non-Budapest based school in our sample. 98 students from 
five school groups participated, 55% of whom were female. Three out of the five groups were 
non-academic, vocational secondary school classes. No technical difficulties were encountered. 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 
Academic 0 0 1 1 0 
Grade 10 10 9 10 10 
Subject 22 19 16 17 24 
Game For Payment Competition Dictator Competition Public good game 
Time now vs. 2 
weeks 
Female 0.05 0.58 0.69 0.71 0.79 
Age  16.82 16.89 16.81 16.53 16.67 
Indifference amount now  1580.91 1667.78 1486.67 1568.00 1538.33 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  1422.73 1642.35 1490.00 1550.67 1467.08 
Risk: # of boxes  32.41 25.74 35.19 28.35 29.46 
Risk, female  42.00 20.27 31.64 30.50 29.05 
Risk, male  31.95 33.25 43.00 23.20 31.00 
Giving to classmate  877.27 692.89 819.06 926.47 927.08 
Giving to schoolmate  622.73 579.53 712.81 594.12 650.00 
Cooperation: contribution  541.18 536.84 725.00 608.82 629.17 
Trust: sum sent  540.91 452.63 593.75 505.88 550.00 
Trust: % returned  45.39 34.64 44.76 41.75 44.44 
Competitive  0.68 0.74 0.44 0.29 0.79 
Competitive, female  1.00 0.64 0.45 0.33 0.74 
Competitive, male  0.67 0.88 0.40 0.20 1.00 
Table 8. Descriptive data from school MK 
Students in this school were on average the most impatient in our sample. They were 
more generous and less cooperative than the average; they also trusted their peers less. In the 
two academic classes, the willingness to compete was extremely low compared to the other 
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groups. Despite this, students had average competitiveness rates, but below-average risk-taking 
willingness. Differences between group-level measures are large in this school as well. 
3.5 School SZB 
We visited four school groups with 70 students, 41% of them were female. All groups 
were academic classes. This school operates in a smaller Hungarian town and has strong 
relations with the Calvinist church. 
Although no technical difficulties arose, many students from the participating classes 
were absent due to a choir competition which was taking place at the time of our experiment. 
We have to take this into account when assessing the effect of the gender composition of groups 
on the preferences. For instance, SZB is one of the three schools where female students are 
more competitive on average than their male schoolmates, although the proportion of female 
students among the actual participants was low. 
There are three schools with an exceptionally high level of risk aversion. Despite the 
above-average willingness to compete, school SZB is one of these. Cooperation and trust 
measures from this school are also among the lowest in the sample. 
Group 1 2 3 4 
Academic 1 1 1 1 
Grade 11 11 12 12 
Subject 22 13 20 15 
Game For Payment Public good game Trust game Competition Competition 
Female 0.36 0.50 0.45 0.33 
Age  17.00 16.75 17.85 17.53 
Indifference amount now  1517.73 1406.92 1436.11 1447.33 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  1412.86 1538.46 1383.00 1417.33 
Risk: # of boxes  28.82 28.23 30.45 29.79 
Risk, female  22.38 24.67 26.33 38.80 
Risk, male  32.50 32.33 33.82 24.78 
Giving to classmate  763.64 800.00 852.50 823.67 
Giving to schoolmate  654.55 465.38 474.00 480.00 
Cooperation: contribution  520.45 583.85 521.50 491.33 
Trust: sum sent  509.09 446.15 440.00 613.33 
Trust: % returned  41.28 45.54 42.33 41.87 
Competitive  0.64 0.85 0.80 0.80 
Competitive, female  0.75 0.83 0.67 1.00 
Competitive, male  0.57 0.83 0.91 0.70 
Table 9. Descriptive data from school SZB 
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3.6 School PB 
School PB is a Catholic school operating in Budapest. We measured the preferences of 
99 students from 4 academic classes. 56% of the participants were female. School PB was the 
only institution with two students opting out of participation. They would have been in Group 
4. During the second group session, the program froze, but after restarting the zLeaf clients, 
everyone was able to continue playing without any data loss. Some students had to type in their 
answers to the trust game again. 
These students were the most patient in the sample. Besides, this school has a great 
gender difference in risk-taking and willingness to compete, with male students being more 
risk-tolerant and competitive.  
Group 1 2 3 4 
Academic 1 1 1 1 
Grade 12 11 11 9 
Subject 25 20 20 34 
Game For Payment Time 4 weeks vs. 6 weeks 
Time 4 weeks vs. 6 
weeks Competition Risk 
Female 0.60 0.53 0.60 0.53 
Age  17.83 16.84 16.95 14.88 
Indifference amount now  1266.40 1291.58 1344.74 1296.06 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  1350.80 1262.00 1389.47 1389.71 
Risk: # of boxes  34.24 33.37 33.50 29.29 
Risk, female  30.80 31.67 23.08 28.59 
Risk, male  39.40 34.33 49.13 31.13 
Giving to classmate  638.00 662.50 755.05 838.24 
Giving to schoolmate  492.00 530.00 345.30 547.35 
Cooperation: contribution  558.36 603.20 615.00 605.88 
Trust: sum sent  576.00 620.00 510.00 502.94 
Trust: % returned  32.86 40.47 33.49 41.83 
Competitive  0.64 0.75 0.60 0.50 
Competitive, female  0.60 0.60 0.58 0.35 
Competitive, male  0.70 0.89 0.63 0.60 
Table 10. Descriptive data from school PB 
3.7 School KB2 
KB2 was the school with the highest rate of female participants (90%), because it is both 
a high school and a healthcare vocational school. A total of 65 students attended our 
experimental sessions in four classes. Only one of the classes were academic. This school is 
located in Budapest. The school belongs to the Catholic Church, but compared to the other 
religious schools (SZB, PB) this school was less spiritual. 
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School KB2 is among the three schools with extremely high risk aversion; in fact, 
students in KB2 are the most risk-averse in the whole sample. Average cooperation and trust 
levels are also the lowest among all schools; competitiveness is below average as well. There 
is only one school with more impatient students than this school (MK). Lastly, these groups 
were more generous than the average. 
Group 1 2 3 4 
Academic 0 1 0 0 
Grade 9 9 10 10 
Subject 17 17 22 9 
Game For Payment Competition Risk Trust game Public good game 
Female 0.94 0.81 0.90 1.00 
Age  15.76 15.63 16.14 16.67 
Indifference amount now  1374.38 1552.50 1440.95 1812.22 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  1491.88 1572.35 1504.55 1640.00 
Risk: # of boxes  30.35 28.71 23.09 22.67 
Risk, female  29.13 33.23 22.74 22.67 
Risk, male  50.00 13.33 37.50   
Giving to classmate  858.82 879.41 827.27 844.44 
Giving to schoolmate  632.35 576.47 625.00 600.00 
Cooperation: contribution  494.12 480.41 580.64 425.33 
Trust: sum sent  429.41 482.35 522.73 455.56 
Trust: % returned  32.47 42.95 35.43 27.43 
Competitive  0.24 0.65 0.68 0.44 
Competitive, female  0.25 0.69 0.68 0.44 
Competitive, male  0.00 0.33 0.50   
Table 11. Descriptive data from school KB2 
3.8 School NE 
103 students from four academic classes participated in the assessment from school NE, 
an institution located in a rural Hungarian town. 56% of the students were female. 
Our program froze during the first session while participants were at the competition 
game. This must have affected our data because after the restart, the program continued at the 
very end of the competition round the students were in, without allowing them to complete the 
task. We take into account these technical difficulties in our data by creating a dummy variable 
for those students who were affected by this problem. 
Students in NE were more impatient than the average, and all of their social preference 
measures were below-average. Their risk and competitiveness measures were around the 
sample mean, but we see different results by gender. Female students in NE were more risk-
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tolerant and competitive than the average of all female students in our sample, and the opposite 
is true for male students. 
Group 1 2 3 4 
Academic 1 1 1 1 
Grade 11 11 11 11 
Subject 27 24 33 19 
Game For Payment Dictator Time 4 weeks vs. 6 weeks Trust game Dictator 
Female 0.38 0.79 0.55 0.53 
Age  17.04 17.83 17.45 17.47 
Indifference amount now  1517.78 1443.18 1479.09 1498.82 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  1435.38 1367.83 1509.39 1453.33 
Risk: # of boxes  38.31 37.96 34.12 31.95 
Risk, female  33.33 37.42 29.17 40.00 
Risk, male  40.38 40.00 40.07 23.00 
Giving to classmate  767.04 741.67 553.33 560.79 
Giving to schoolmate  490.74 475.00 524.85 275.00 
Cooperation: contribution  698.96 534.17 550.15 562.58 
Trust: sum sent  644.44 537.50 509.09 500.00 
Trust: % returned  41.96 36.41 34.13 37.07 
Competitive  0.59 0.54 0.67 0.53 
Competitive, female  0.70 0.53 0.67 0.50 
Competitive, male  0.50 0.60 0.67 0.56 
Table 12. Descriptive data from school NE 
3.9 School KK 
We assessed the preference measures of 166 students from 7 academic school groups in 
school KK that operates in a rural town. 66% of the participants were female. Although the 
program froze during the competition game at Group 7, it only affected four people. They were 
not able to complete one of the three competition rounds which must have affected their results. 
As before, we take into account these technical difficulties in our data by creating a dummy 
variable for those students who were affected by this problem. 
KK is the third school with very high risk aversion compared to the sample mean. 
However, the willingness to compete on school level (female and male students combined) is 
exactly the same as the average (although male students are far more competitive than their 
female peers). 
We measured the most significant average difference between the two indifference 
points in time in this school. Students here were much more patient in the present than in the 
future. The level of generosity was around average, but the measures of cooperation and trust 
were below-average. 
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Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Academic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Grade 9 10 9 10 9 10 11 
Subject 28 24 23 30 19 18 24 
Game For Payment Public good game Risk 
Time 4 weeks vs. 
6 weeks 
Time 4 weeks vs. 
6 weeks Risk Trust game Risk 
Female 0.79 0.58 0.87 0.87 0.32 0.22 0.75 
Age  15.75 16.71 15.78 16.70 15.74 16.89 17.79 
Indifference amount now  1438.52 1378.26 1409.55 1278.28 1421.05 1356.11 1400.00 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  1551.48 1367.73 1589.57 1465.33 1511.05 1317.22 1508.33 
Risk: # of boxes  24.07 34.25 22.57 27.50 28.95 34.56 39.00 
Risk, female  22.18 33.36 20.70 28.85 15.00 17.00 39.59 
Risk, male  31.00 35.50 35.00 18.75 35.38 39.57 37.00 
Giving to classmate  960.71 846.04 826.09 831.70 873.63 594.39 658.33 
Giving to schoolmate  705.00 566.88 586.96 621.67 555.21 394.44 518.75 
Cooperation: contribution  621.39 566.58 503.48 515.30 588.68 652.78 595.42 
Trust: sum sent  528.57 545.83 482.61 456.67 473.68 450.00 583.33 
Trust: % returned  40.33 37.89 36.24 34.80 35.24 39.92 40.74 
Competitive  0.50 0.63 0.65 0.53 0.68 0.89 0.54 
Competitive, female  0.45 0.50 0.65 0.54 0.33 0.50 0.56 
Competitive, male  0.67 0.80 0.67 0.50 0.85 1.00 0.50 
Table 13. Descriptive data from school KK 
3.10 School KSZ 
There were 105 participants in 5 school groups, two of which were academic classes. 
The other three were vocational secondary school classes. 66% of the students were female.  
ZTree froze during the competition game at Group 3, but it did not affect all zLeaf 
clients. The results of those who were not able to complete one of the three competition rounds 
must have been affected by this accident. We take into account these technical difficulties in 
our data by creating a dummy variable for those students who were affected by this problem. 
The school could not access the NABC ID-s of the students in Group 2 and 3 at the time 
of the experiment, and in the absence of these, we were also not able to retrieve background 
data regarding these two groups. The breakdown of competition preferences by gender is hence 
incomplete. 
We measured the second biggest average difference between the two indifference points 
in time in this school, with students being more patient in the present. Generosity was also 
higher than average here. Students in KSZ were less risk-tolerant than the average, but this is 
mainly driven by female students. The willingness to compete of both male and female students 
is greater than the sample means by gender. 
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Group 1 2 3 4 5 
Academic 0 1 1 0 0 
Grade 11 10 9 12 12 
Subject 17 22 30 20 16 
Game For Payment 
Time 4 weeks vs. 6 
weeks 
Time 4 weeks vs. 6 
weeks Dictator 
Public good 
game Dictator 
Female 0.69     0.50 0.81 
Age  18.69     20.00 19.13 
Indifference amount now  1366.47 1390.00 1289.00 1357.00 1495.00 
Indifference amount 4 weeks  1392.35 1444.55 1373.67 1469.50 1593.13 
Risk: # of boxes  26.29 27.41 33.97 34.20 36.25 
Risk, female  24.00     29.11 35.00 
Risk, male  31.80     40.22 41.67 
Giving to classmate  908.82 890.91 943.33 725.25 837.50 
Giving to schoolmate  570.59 740.91 690.00 548.75 531.25 
Cooperation: contribution  606.18 577.50 631.87 715.00 606.56 
Trust: sum sent  576.47 545.45 500.00 585.00 543.75 
Trust: % returned  36.59 43.40 39.34 44.88 34.88 
Competitive  0.76 0.59 0.70 0.70 0.69 
Competitive, female  0.64     0.67 0.62 
Competitive, male  1.00     0.78 1.00 
Table 14. Descriptive data from school KSZ 
4 Validation 
We have measured four types of preferences, and we have data on the socio-
demographics of our participants. In this section, we will validate our measurements along two 
dimensions. On the one hand, there are a few experiments that measure many preferences at the 
same time, so we can compare if the correlations between the measured preferences found in 
those experiments are present in our measurement as well. On the other hand, there is a vast 
literature examining how preferences relate to individual characteristics, so we can check how 
the findings of the literature compare to ours. 
Starting with the correlation between different preferences, Dean and Ortoleva (2019) 
report the joint distribution of 11 behavioural phenomena, among them many that we also 
investigate. Here we consider only those correlations that we have an analogue for in our 
analysis. Note that Dean and Ortoleva (2019) do not study generosity, cooperation and 
competitiveness. They document a strong positive relationship between time preference 
measured between now and later and time preference measured between two future dates. Time 
preference related between two future dates also associates with cognitive ability in their study, 
more impatient subjects exhibiting lower cognitive ability. Time preference related to choice 
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today vs later is related to risk aversion, more risk-averse subjects being less patient. Behaviour 
in the trust game correlates with neither time nor risk preferences, however sending and 
returning choices in the trust game show a strong and positive association. The positive 
relationship between being female and risk aversion is also reported. 
Horn and Kiss (2018) use a pool of Hungarian university students to study how different 
preferences associate with school performance. They measure the same preferences, except 
trust and generosity. Similarly to Dean and Ortoleva (2019), they find a significant positive 
association between the present (today vs later) and future (two future dates) time preferences 
and a negative relationship between future time preference and cognitive abilities. They also 
report that more risk-averse subjects tend to cooperate less, but have better cognitive skills. 
Furthermore, they document that females are more risk-averse. 
Turning to the relationship between socio-demographics and preferences, Sutter et al. 
(2019) provide a review of the literature on how preferences are and evolve in children and 
adolescents. We will check if the associations reported in this review are present in our data as 
well. Concerning time preferences, they report that patience increases typically with age, but 
there is no clear gender difference. Socioeconomic status (SES) also relates to time preferences, 
low SES predicting more impatient choices. Concerning risk preferences, most of the literature 
reports that females are more risk-averse than males. Low SES associates with more risk-taking.  
Turning to social preferences, the literature has documented that females tend to be more 
generous than males. Low SES correlates with less prosociality. In trust games, trusting 
behaviour (captured by the amount sent) and trustworthiness (proxied by the amount returned) 
increase with age. No gender effect is found generally in the trust game. Cooperativeness also 
typically increases with age. No gender effects are reported in cooperation, and not much is 
known about the impact of SES. Concerning competitiveness, females generally are less willing 
to compete than males. Low SES associates with lower competitiveness. 
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Table 14 contains a correlation matrix with individual data collected in our research. 
Considering associations between preferences, we observe a high and significant correlation 
between our time preference measures, in line with the findings in the literature. As in the 
literature, we also find that less patient individuals tend to have lower cognitive abilities. 
Similarly to Dean and Ortoleva (2019), we observe that more risk-averse participants tend to 
be less patient, and there is also a high correlation between the money sent and returned in the 
trust game. Contrary to Dean and Ortoleva (2019), sending in the trust game associates 
significantly both with time and risk preferences: more patient and more risk-tolerant 
participants send more money in the trust game. 
Similarly to Horn and Kiss (2018), we see that more risk tolerance goes hand in hand 
with cooperation and cognitive abilities as well. Overall, we see most of the correlations in our 
data that the cited papers exhibit. Moreover, our data reveal that more patient participants tend 
to be more cooperative and tend to send more in the trust game. Generosity is also positively 
related to choices in the trust game.15  
 
15
 Note that most of these significant associations could not be seen in the cited papers as those papers did not 
study all the preferences that we have in this research. 
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Female 1.000 
           
 
(2) Age 0.038 1.000 
           
(3) Math6 -0.270* -0.118* 1.000 
          
(4) High SES -0.135* -0.146* 0.386* 1.000 
         
(5) Indifference amount now -0.005 0.037 -0.126* -0.052 1.000 
        
(6) Indifference amount 4 weeks 0.105* 0.004 -0.246* -0.146* 0.544* 1.000 
       
(7) Risk: # of boxes -0.171* 0.060 0.251* 0.104* 0.018 -0.122* 1.000 
      
(8) Giving to classmate 0.156* -0.026 -0.132* -0.018 -0.048 0.021 -0.142* 1.000 
     
(9) Giving to schoolmate 0.118* -0.029 -0.089* -0.029 -0.049 -0.010 -0.109* 0.517* 1.000 
    
(10) Cooperation: contribution -0.067* -0.002 0.190* 0.065* -0.087* -0.088* 0.140* 0.138* 0.126* 1.000 
   
(11) Trust: sum sent -0.166* 0.029 0.210* 0.123* -0.061* -0.121* 0.215* 0.266* 0.230* 0.450* 1.000 
  
(12) Trust: % returned -0.090* 0.044 -0.023 -0.022 -0.014 -0.014 0.003 0.294* 0.270* 0.252* 0.324* 1.000 
 
(13) Competitive -0.098* 0.072* -0.031 -0.049 0.043 -0.025 0.091* -0.028 -0.012 0.033 0.047 0.030 1.000 
 
NOTES: * shows significance at the 0.05 level  
High SES: Dummy =1 if at least one of the parents has a diploma  
Math6: Math score in the National Assessment of Basic Competences, a proxy for cognitive abilities  
Larger indifference amounts indicate less patience. 
Our risk measure (# of boxes collected) indicates in fact risk tolerance, so the higher is this number, the less risk-averse is the participant. 
Trust: sum returned: It is the average of the shares returned to the sender in the trust game for different amounts of money received 
Competitive: Dummy, 0- piece rate payment, 1 – tournament payment 
Table 15. Pairwise correlations of background variables and preference measures (without the data of the Pilot school) 
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Turning to the associations between socio-demographics and preferences, we do not see 
any relationship between age and patience, though the sign coincides with what we have in the 
literature. This may be because the literature investigates a longer age span while our 
participants are all 15-20 years old. Regarding the association between gender and patience, our 
correlations are in line with the literature in the sense that there is no strong result as on the 
short horizon, we do not see any association. In contrast, on the long horizon females tend to 
be more impatient. Socioeconomic status has the same effect on patience as in the literature as 
on both horizons participants with a better family background are more patient. On a longer 
horizon, the relationship is significant. 
In line with the literature, females are significantly more risk-averse than males in our 
sample. However, we observe a positive association between risk tolerance and family 
background, contrary to findings reported in Sutter et al. (2019). We also observe in our data 
that participants with better cognitive abilities are more risk-tolerant, an association also 
reported by Dohmen et al. (2010).  
In line with the literature, females are significantly more generous (captured by the 
giving behaviour to classmates and schoolmates) than males in our sample. However, while the 
sign coincides with that of the literature, we do not document a significant relationship between 
family background and generosity. Even though the sign is in line with the findings in the 
literature, we do not see a significant association between age and choices in the trust game, 
contrary to previous research. In our sample, females send and return significantly less than 
males, as opposed to the literature. We observe the same patterns as of cooperativeness. 
Regarding competitiveness, in line with the literature females are less competitive. While the 
literature is mixed on the effect of age, older participants in our sample tend to compete more. 
We also observe a significant and positive relationship between competitiveness and risk 
tolerance.  
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Overall, although on some points the correlations in our data do not agree with those 
reported in the literature, in most of the cases, our findings coincide with what other researchers 
found. Thus, we consider that we successfully measured the preferences of the students. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper documents the experiments that we carried out in 10 Hungarian high schools 
from March 2018 to March 2020. We described the preferences that we measured using 
experimental tasks, and we also reported the execution of the experiments. Furthermore, we 
presented the main descriptive statistics aggregated over all schools, but also on a school and 
class level. We carried out a validation exercise to show that our measurements are in line with 
previous research. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Appendix A - Instructions 
Dear participant! 
First of all, we would like to thank you for your participation in this experiment. The 
data collected during the experiment will be used for research purposes at the Institute of 
Economics of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies. 
Participation is VOLUNTARY. You can quit the experiment at any time without having 
to give any justification, or you may deny answering questions. 
During the experiment, you will participate in 8 small games in which you will have to 
make different choices. You need to know that there is no objectively right answer in any of 
the decisions. Moreover, we are not interested in individual decisions, but in how people decide 
in such situations on average. Before each decision, we will describe the situation in detail and 
we will explain what the choice is about. If the description or the explanation is not clear, please 
raise your hand, and the experimenter will answer your question. 
You should know that depending on your choices, you will earn canteen vouchers at the 
end of the experiment. More precisely, at the end of the experiment, we will pick one of the 
games randomly, and your decision in that game determines your earning. You can use the 
vouchers that you earn instead of money in the canteen of the school until the date that you see 
on the blackboard. 
Note that in some situations, the earnings do not depend on your decision only, but also 
on the decision of another participant. We will describe in the presentation of each situation 
how the earnings would be determined if that game were picked for payment. The payment will 
take place after the experiment. You will receive the vouchers here in the room. 
Participation in the research is ANONYMOUS. During the experiment, we will not ask 
for any personal data. Your answers will be linked to the data of the National Assessment of 
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Basic Competences using your NABC ID. No data will be given to third parties. We will treat 
all information that we collect during the research confidentially. 
Please, remain silent during the experiment and do not disturb each other. It is forbidden 
to talk! Should you have a question, turn to the experimenter. Please, silence your mobile 
phone! Those who misbehave will be excluded from the experiment. In an extreme case, we 
may exclude the whole group, and nobody will earn anything. 
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
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7.2 Appendix B – Measurement of time preferences with the staircase method 
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7.3 Appendix C – Visualization of between-school heterogeneity 
Probability density functions – all schools together: 
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Probability density functions – schools separated: 
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